IN the last twenty years, the theory of utility maximisation has had extensive application as a basis for deriving empirically estimable demand equations. This method of analysing and measuring demand has tended not to use general utility functions, but rather to depend upon specifications which assume that preferences are either directly or indirectly additive. Two models in particular have been used very widely; the linear expenditure system, first applied by Stone (1954), which assumes direct additivity, and the indirect addilog model, due to Leser (1941-42) and Houthakker (1960), which assumes indirect addivity. In addition to these, the directly additive models suggested by Frisch (1959) and by Powell (1966) have found practical application in a number of contexts, as have the more recent additive dynamic models of Houthakker and Taylor (1970) and of Phlips (1972). As estimation problems have been brought under control, these models have been applied to a wide range of data for different countries and today their use is part of the standard methodology of applied demand analysis.2
very seriously, and in spite of their enormous practical advantages, the whole question of their suitability for applied work should be reconsidered.
We proceed first by proving the results, secondly by assessing their empirical implications, and finally by considering the wider consequences for the methodology of applied demand analysis.
Following Houthakker (1960) , directly additive utility functions may be written in the form v(q) 0{kVk (qk)} .
where v is utility, defined over Rn, the space of the n quantities q, the Vk are n sub-utility functions, each a function of qk only, while O{ } is an arbitrary monotone increasing function. Indirectly additive functions are defined in terms of the n ratios of income, u, to price, p, i.e., where ei is the income elasticity of the ith good, eij is the (uncompensated) cross-price elasticity of good i with respect to the price of good j, and 3ij is the Kronecker delta, equal to unity if i = j and zero otherwise. The use of CO', which is Frisch's flexibility of the marginal utility of money, is justified, since if the utility function is explicitly additive, i.e., 6{x} x, the quantity has this interpretation. Combining (4) and (5), = a~ log (A/ +e').6 c)ei,j ~ ei a log pj ) e *
This may be simplified by multiplying by wi, the value share of the ith good, and summing over i to enforce the aggregation restriction, E wie,j + wj = 0; thus -a log (A/)') c a log pj +wj e, . (7) which, substituted in (6), gives' ei= -eisij e,wj(l + ej) . (8) where ?, c -1 Since the income elasticities are of the order of unity, (2wkek 1), and since the average value shares w are of the order n-1, the cross-elasticities are small relative to the own-price elasticity, and the latter is dominated by the first term on the right-hand side of (8), i.e., ei, cei *.
This relationship, of proportionality between income and own-price elasticities, was first put forward by Pigou in 1910 and may thus be known as " Pigou's Law."2 Clearly, the approximation will only be close for a good which occupies a very small fraction of the budget and it will only be close for all goods if the level of disaggregation adopted is high. But the main interest in focusing attention on (9) is empirical; what is really important is the extent to which the approximation applies in empirical work using additive models, and whether or not there is evidence that proportionality, however approximate, distorts measurement. We shall see below, in the case of a particular additive system, that even for quite highly aggregated groupings of commodities, the relationship (9) is a remarkably close approximation.
For indirect additivity, we may proceed directly to the demand equations via Roy's theorem, i.e., log q, = log (-a) -log (av) . * * (10) so that, substituting from (2), log qi log vi' + log u -2 log pi -log ( vk'PkIJ) * (11) As in the case of direct additivity, the cross-elasticities are small relative to the own-elasticities, and once again the latter may be approximated in a simple manner, i.e., ei i ei -(1 + c). (17) which is again linear, but now with a slope of minus unity and a positive intercept. So that while, under direct additivity, it is the ratio of price to income elasticity which is approximately constant, under indirect additivity, it is their sum. If the marginal utility of money, and thus co' and i, are to have the same interpretation under both types of additivity, it is clear that the two approximations^ will only coincide when ci = = -1. In this case, each expenditure is proportional to income, and this is the only behaviour which is consistent with simultaneous direct and indirect additivity defined in this way; see Samuelson (1965) . However, for empirical purposes, there is no reason to suppose that the flexibility defined by direct additivity should be identical with the flexibility defined by indirect additivity. Indeed, a given demand system may be consistent with additive utility functions of both types, each representing the same ordinal preference ordering, although the cardinal levels of utility and of marginal utility will be different for each function. This is the case Samuelson calls non-simultaneous direct and indirect additivity; here the flexibility will be different for each of the approximations and the two lines (9) and (17) will intersect at a single point representing all the income and own-price elasticities of the system. Samuelson has derived the most general form of utility function consistent with both direct and indirect additivity, and the interested reader may check that for the resulting demand equations, the income elasticities are all unity and the own-price elasticities are all equal, apart from terms of order n'1.
Neither of these special cases is of great empirical interest; however, the independence in theory of the two definitions of the flexibility is matched by the disparate interpretations provided by the two approximations. Under direct additivity, estimates of cii will be derived from an appropriately weighted average of the ratios of income to price elasticities, and it is perhaps not too surprising that this ratio should demonstrate such stability across countries. Under indirect additivity, there is no reason to suppose that calculations embodying (17) will lead to similar estimates for co' and although fewer estimates of the flexibility based on indirect additivity seem to have been published, those I can findI seem to be closer to -1 than to -2, this latter being the central estimate for directly additive models.
The validity of the two approximations (9) and (17) is not really a major point at issue; there is already a good deal of evidence against additivity per se and while the assumptions imply more than either of the relationships discussed, it would be extraordinary if the latter had nothing to do with the general invalidity of the hypothesis. There is also some direct evidence to support this view. In another context (Deaton, 1974), the author tested a version of the Rotterdam demand system intermediate between the symmetric and directly additive versions of the model; this model retains the structure of the additive substitution matrix while abandoning the link between own-price and income elasticities. This separates the proportionality effects of additivity from its other, more general restrictions. On longrun United Kingdom data, both sets of constraints were rejected; thus, while proportionality itself is invalid, it is not the only aspect of additivity which is contrary to the evidence.
The most obvious way of independently assessing the relationship between income and price elasticities without imposing either (9) or (1 7) is to estimate a set of loglinear demand equations by regressing the log of quantity demanded against the log of real income and the log of price relative to a price index. This methodology, though deficient from a theoretical point of view, is simple and it gives estimates of elasticities directly; for these reasons it is still often used in demand analysis.2 Since the quality of the two approximations (9) and (17), depends upon the degree of commodity disaggregation, experiments were carried out on two different versions of the same data. For the first set, data on purchases of thirty-seven distinct non-durable commodities from 1954 to 1970 were taken from C.S.O. (1971), while for the second set, the goods were aggregated into eight broad groups. The resulting estimates3 of the price and income elasticities are plotted against one another in Fig. 1 ; the points are for the 37-commodities, the crosses for the 8-commodities. Clearly, there is no visual evidence for either of the relationships required by direct or indirect additivity; indeed, the correlation between the points is actually positive. Note also that the broad groups do not appear to conform any more than do the more detailed commodities. The visual impression may be confirmed by imposing, say, the proportionality relationship for different values of b and computing F-ratios for the restriction; as expected, this was rejected for a substantial number of commodities, confirming the general inapplicability of such a relationship.
However, too much emphasis can be placed upon these particular ' calculated for the year 1963 from parameter estimates of the linear expenditure system.' Clearly, the proportionality approximation is very close, even for the broad groups. The kind of distortion which is induced by this can best be assessed with reference to a hypothetical, though not unrealistic, example. Consider a good which is normal though not particularly income elastic, but which has a high own-price elasticity; there is no theoretical reason to suppose that such may not exist. Suppose further that on average, I Details of estimation are discussed fully in a forthcoming monograph by the author; this will also discuss much more fully other aspects of these results.
the price of the good is rising relative to that of other commodities, and that, as a result, the quantity consumed is falling in spite of increases in real income. This is not unlikely; the consumption of rail travel in the United Kingdom can be explained quite adequately in this way. If this good is to be modelled by an additive demand system, in order to have a high price elasticity, it must have a much higher income elasticity, since the ratio of the two must be the same as for all other goods. But this would involve a trend increase in consumption, and this does not fit the data. Consequently, the model, in order to match the secular decline in consumption, must make the good inferior and this has the final absurd consequence, via Pigou's Law, of rendering the commodity positively price elastic, i.e., a Giffen good.' Thus, if there are any cyclical price effects, the predicted expenditures of the model, though following the trend correctly, will reverse the cycle. In the application of the linear expenditure system to the thirty-seven commodity data, almost a quarter of the goods were classed as inferior Giffen goods, an indication of how widespread the difficulties are. Detailed analysis of each commodity confirms this and reveals that the range of price and income responses required to explain the evidence is not exaggerated by the contrast between Figs. 1 and 2. Clearly, aggregation to broad groups reduces the incidence of extreme cases, and certainly the hypothetical example is the worst possible type of behaviour for additivity to model, but the basic point remains; additive models will only work well when the ratio of price to income elasticities is genuinely equal for all commodities and there is no reason to suppose that this is more likely for broad groups than for more differentiated commodities. The above argument, though put in terms of direct additivity, could easily be recast to deal with the indirectly additive case. It is hardly necessary to estimate the indirect addilog model and go through a similar analysis to show that, in this case too, very similar difficulties are bound to arise.
These results clearly add substance to the considerable body of evidence against additivity which already exists. However, it is possible to go further and to argue that the reinterpretation of the causes of invalidity make the case for not using additivity a much more compelling one. For, if additivity is regarded primarily as a means of dealing with cross-price responses in a simple and theoretically plausible manner, its rejection on the evidence is not likely to be of crucial importance. Let us see why this is so and why the results of the paper alter the position. As commonly interpreted, the restrictions of additivity are taken as linking the off-diagonal terms of the price substitution matrix to the corresponding income responses, see, e.g., Houthakker (1960) . Since in econometric work, the whole range of cross-price effects is almost never measurable without prior information, and since such terms are likely to be of limited importance in any case, one or other of the additivity assumptions is enormously helpful, allowing as it does the estimation of a complete system on very limited information. If the assumption is found to be invalid because there exists some cross-price behaviour which cannot be allowed for under additivity, this is neither very unexpected nor very serious. The difficulty of modelling cross-price behaviour adequately is, after all, very great compared to the reward for doing so, since the latter is likely to be only a minor increase in the verisimilitude of secondary effects. Alternative methodologies do exactly the same; loglinear models treat cross-price effects by subsuming them into a general price index in a way which is inconsistent even with Walras' law, although these defects may well be offset by other more practical advantages. However, the results proved above and the evidence on distortion seriously challenge the usefulness of additivity as a simplifying assumption of this sort. Convenience and ease of estimation are purchased at the cost of severe distortion of those effects which it is most desirable to measure accurately. On this argument, the extent to which additivity has been used in applied work seriously over-states its real usefulness.
The principal alternative models for demand analysis, if additivity is to be abandoned, are the more " pragmatic " systems, for example the loglinear or Rotterdam models. Although these are both fundamentally inconsistent with utility maximisation, the theory may still find a role in the provision of restrictions to aid estimation and improve precision. These models, though lacking the theoretical plausibility of systems such as the linear expenditure or addilog models, are extremely flexible and may be used to model a wide range of non-additive price behaviour. In any case, in view of the recent negative results by Sonnenschein (1972) and (1973), and Debreu (1973) , consistency with utility maximisation may be but a dubious requirement for aggregate models,l and these pragmatic systems remain the most promising tools of demand analysis currently available. If utility function based models are to compete with these, they must use non-additive functions and very few of these exist. The oldest, the quadratic utility function, is unsatisfactory from a number of points of view,2 while the one of the newest, the extension of the linear expenditure system suggested by Nasse (1970) is promising, but relatively untried.3 One superficially attractive possibility, Brown and Heien's (1972) S-branch utility tree, is unfortunately much less flexible than it appears and embodies the proportionality law in a weaker, but still unpalatable, form; this system is briefly discussed in the Appendix. 
CONCLUSION
At a time when consumer demand theory has been shown to be of only limited usefulness in the study of general equilibrium, the case still remains to be made for it in its alternative application, to the practical analysis of observed consumer behaviour. However, although non-additive preference orderings may yet yield important insights into observed phenomena, the main argument of this paper is that the assumption of additive preferences is almost certain to be invalid in practice and the use of demand models based on such an assumption will lead to severe distortion of measurement. So that if the price to be paid for the theoretical consistency of demand models is the necessity of assuming additive preferences, then the price is too high. Thus, the universal proportionality approximation (9) is replaced by a series of such relationships, one for each group. Clearly, this is less restrictive than the original version and the S-branch model can thus be expected to fit the data better than the linear expenditure system. On the other hand, in an absolute sense, these new restrictions are just as implausible and as unlikely to be valid as the old. The S-branch is thus not general enough to overcome the principal objections to strict additivity.
